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Classroom Collective Bargaining Simulation 
How Close to the Real Thing 
Lane Tracy 
and 
Richard B. Peterson 
The use of games and simulations as means of instruc-
tion is particularly appropriate to a behavioral process such 
as collective bargaining. The author describes, analyses and 
évaluâtes one which is used at the University of Washington. 
Introduction 
During the past décade there has been increasing use of simulation 
techniques in collège and university classrooms. The simulations used in 
business schools hâve ranged from computer modeling of an investment 
décision to playing the Prisoner's Dilemma. 
Most of the simulations hâve been developed on the assumption that 
(1) the concepts are better understood through actual expérience with 
them, and (2) student motivation is enhanced by involvement in the 
exercice (when compared to the traditional lecture method of imparting 
information). Furthermore, it has been argued that one can only really 
« understand » the concept or idea by gaining a « gut level » reaction 
to it. This argument would seem particularly relevant to the study of 
interpersonal and intergroup processes, such as collective bargaining. 
Attainment of the twin objectives of increased student motivation 
and better understanding of concepts can best be net if the simulation 
provides a microcosm of the real world. Collective bargaining simulations 
hâve the potential of meeting both of those objectives. First, the simula-
tion exposes the student to the realities and émotions of the bargaining 
process. Secondly, to the degree that 
the simulation really captures the 
dynamics of bargaining behavior, 
the simulation offers spécifie skills 
which are usable in the job market. 
TRACY, L., Associate Professer, 
Collège of Business Administration, 
University of Ohio. 
PETERSON, R. B., Associate Pro-
fessor, of Management and Organi-
zation, University of Washington. 
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A number of business schools throughout the United States and 
Canada use collective bargaining simulations as a means of teaching their 
students about labor negotiations. One of the earliest such games was 
The Case of Bruns and Bruce, developed by BNA président John D. 
Stewart in 1959. Its use as a training tool was reported by French 
(1961), who later described the use of collective bargaining simulation 
at the University of Washington (1962). The negotiating games currently 
in use range from relatively short exercises like the Exercise Negotiations 
(Bass, et al.), IRC's Collective Bargaining Game, Contract Negotiations 
(Zif & Otlewski, 1969), Collective Bargaining (Rausch, 1968) and 
Settle or Strike (Abt Associates, 1967) to more complex exercises like 
Tempco Métal Products (Peterson & Kienest, 1973), Mock Negotiation 
Problem (Sloane & Witney, 1972) and Cashford Container Corporation 
(Kuechle, 1969). The more complex exercises entail longer time periods 
and require considérable research preparatory to the actual bargaining 
sessions. 
Do collective bargaining games do a good job of simulating the real 
thing ? Our own expérience at the University of Washington suggests 
that mock negotiations not only hâve value for learning about bargaining, 
but also allow the student considérable insight into interpersonal, intra-
group and intergroup behavior. 
The intent of this paper is to report upon a test of the efficacy of 
a complex collective bargaining game as a Simulator of actual labor-
management negotiations. However, before doing so, it is advisable to 
briefly summarize the major features of the bargaining game as it was 
used at the time of the study. The remaining sections of the paper will 
présent the research design, results, and summary and conclusions. 
The Student Bargaining Game 
At the University of Washington each year approximately 80-100 
students enroll in a course in labor relations in which they are exposed 
to the arbitration and collective bargaining processes — primarily through 
active participation in arbitration and bargaining simulations. 
Since the sections of the course are limited to 16-20 students, the 
course is taught by two différent professors. Each mstructor uses slightly 
différent procédures for the bargaining game. However, the gênerai thrust 
in ail sections is as described below. 
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The students are assigned to bargaining teams very early in the 
quarter. Since there are two concurrent bargaining games per class, the 
students are divided into four teams of 4-5 members. The instructor 
provides : (1) a history of the collective bargaining relationship of the 
parties (which are in the private sector), (2) a copy of the collective 
bargaining agreement, (3) a listing of major issues confronting the 
management and union, and (4) material helpful to the teams in iïguring 
the costs of their demands, etc. 
During the next 3-4 weeks the bargaining teams are responsible for 
independently determining how their contract compares with ongoing 
settlements regarding wages, benefits, hours and working conditions. The 
results of this research lead each management or union team to make 
certain demands of the other party. 
Approximately the 7th week of the term the two parties exchange 
their sets of public demands. At the same time each team présents a 
separate set of private demands and/or expectations to the instructor 
based upon their real needs or expectations. The public demands are 
limited to no more than 15 items while the private demands are held 
to 8 items. However, since wages and fringe benefits represent one item, 
there is considérable flexibility over the issues for negotiations. The limits 
are imposed primarily to help the students in terms of manageability of 
vast amounts of information. The teams are not confined to any given 
bargaining issues. 
During the next three weeks the teams bargain with each other using 
various stratégies and tactics discussed in the readings and lectures. The 
teams can use caucuses, walk-outs, etc., as a means of placing more 
pressure of their opponents or defensively responding to pressures from 
the other team. Since the game is a learning exercise, ail of the students 
are encouraged to take active speaking rôles in the bargaining sessions. 
This represents a departure from the gênerai practice in real-world nego-
tiations, where the chief negotiator usually plays the dominant rôle. 
Each bargaining game allows for a maximum of 10-12 hours of 
direct negotiations prior to the contract deadline, which falls just before 
the end of the quarter. There are options of calling for a mediator 
(another instructor) or scheduling extra sessions prior to the termination 
date. By the termination date of the présent contract there is either a 
strike or settlement. The parties then submit documentation concerning 
the spécifie items included in the settlement or the reasons for the strike. 
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Approximately one-half of the course grade dépends upon the ef-
fectiveness of the individual and his-her team in the bargaining simula-
tion. A certain degree of reality is built into the game by grading the 
exercise. However, it is doubtful that the use of grades can equate with 
the pressures on real labor and management negotiators to « produce » 
at the bargaining table. In addition, there is no way that we can build 
constituent pressure into the simulation, since there is no union member-
ship or top management to pressure or constrain their respective bar-
gaining parties. 
Once the bargaining game commences, there is no further oppor-
tunity for the teams to change their private demands and expectations. 
The instructors do not give any input to individuals or teams during the 
bargaining process. However, at the end of the game, the instructor 
provides feedback to the entire class. The feedback includes the final 
settlement or reasons for the strike as well as analysis of spécifie tactics 
and behaviors employed by members of each bargining team. It is at 
this time that the students can raise questions concerning the stratégies 
and tactics utilized by their opponents. Helpful insights on one's own 
behavior émerge from the discussion. 
This bargaining game captures much of the dynamics of real négo-
ciations, in spite of the lack of constituents or of the neeessity to live with 
the resulting contract. The similarity to real collective bargaining was 
considered sufficient to use student bargainers to prétest a questionnaire 
for a study of the behavioral dynamics of collective bargaining. This led 
us to administer the questionnaire to later student bargaining groups in 
order to compare their reactions with those of real negotiators. The 
détails of the study design are presented in the following section. 
Study Design 
The above-mentioned questionnaire was designed for a study of the 
effects of noneconomic behavioral variables on a negotiator's inclination 
toward settlement on a contract and on his feelings of satisfaction with 
the outeome. Consequently, the questionnaire measured the negotiator's 
perceptions of such variables as : the amount of praise or criticism re-
ceived from teammates or members of the other team, feelings of success, 
the extent of responsibilities and authority, opportunities for growth and 
advancement, friendliness with teammates, the pattern of relationships 
between the teams, and the equitability of the contract. 
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Measurement of thèse variables was by means of questions such as : 
How much personal praise did you receive 
from your teammates ruding the negotiations ? 
none a t a U 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much 
There were at least two, and in some cases four, questions measuring 
each variable. The responses to thèse questions were summed together 
to form variables scores. The variable scores were then analyzed pri-
marily by means of t-tests and a matrix of Pearson product-moment 
corrélation coefficients. 
Since the questionnaire measured attitudes and perceptions of nego-
tiators immediately after settlement on the contract, and since thèse 
attitudes and perceptions were expected to change with time, it was not 
considered possible to establish the test-retest reliability of the question-
naire. No two questions were designed to measure exactly the same thing, 
but Kendall's tau corrélations between questions designed to measure 
différent aspects of a particular variable ranged from .03 to .60, with 
the majority tying in the .30 eo .50 range. 
Data were gathered from real negotiators who had just completed 
negotiations on a contract. The negotiators were asked to respond to the 
questionnaire with référence to thèse recently completed negotiations. 
Both chief negotiators and other team members were asked to respond. 
Responses were obtained from 40 union negotiators and 32 man-
agement negotiators concerning 18 différent contracts. Responses were 
obtained from the management side of ail 18 contracts, and from the 
union side of 15 of them. The contracts were in such industries as manu-
facturing, public transportation, communications, éducation, service, and 
retailing. 
The main hypothèses of the study were that each of the measured 
noneconomic variables was related to (1) the negotiator's personal in-
clination toward settling for the new contract that was finally agreed 
upon, and (2) his satisfaction with that contract. With respect to the first 
hypothesis, it was found for ail negotiators that their personal inclination 
toward settlement was positively related to praise and crédit from both 
sides, agreement with the team's policies and procédures, an overall 
feeling of success in the bargaining, a feeling that their rôle in the bar-
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gaining was suitable and challenging, a coopérative pattern of relation-
ships between the parties, and the judgment that the new contract was 
équitable. Ail of thèse relationships were found by one-tailed t-test to 
be significant at least at the .05 level, and the last four were significant 
at the .01 level. The findings for the second hypothesis were similar, 
except that the relationship to the feeling that the rôle was suitable and 
challanging was nonsignificant. 
It was found, however, that there were considérable différences be-
tween union and management negotiators. Thèse différences can be seen 
in Table 1. 
The findings of this study of union and management negotiators are 
reported more fully elsewhere (Tracy, 1974). For purposes of this paper, 
we are more interester in comparing the findings for thèse real negotiators 
with the responses from students who hâve completed a mock negotiation. 
Concurrent with the study of real negotiators, the same questionnaire 
was given to 28 students in two sections of the labor relations course at 
the University of Washington. Thèse students had just completed one of 
three différent negotiations under two différent instructors. The relation-
ships of their responses to the noneconomic variables with their inclina-
tion toward settlement are shown in Table 1, beside the relationships for 
real union and management negotiators. 
It can be seen from this table that the reactions of the student nego-
tiators differed considerably from those of their real counterparts, often 
being in the opposite direction. The student's reactions also seem to be 
stronger than those of the real negotiators. This might in part be attrib-
utable to the smaller sample of negotiations about which the student were 
responding. The newness of the negotiation might also tend to make 
student reactions sharper. The variable of expérience needs to be added 
to the analysis. 
The différences in corrélations are suggestive, but a better way to 
test the similarities and différences of the real and student negotiators 
is to look at their responses directly. For that purpose we made use of 
multivariate analysis of variance and discriminant analysis. There clas-
sification variables were used : student-real, labor-management, and 
experienced-inexperienced. Although our basic interest was in the dif-
férences between real and student negotiators, the other two classification 
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TABLE 1 
Pearson Product-Moment Corrélations of Noneconomic Variables in Bargaining 
with Inclination toward Settlement on the Contract, for Union and 
Management Real Negotiators and Student Mock Negotiators. 
Noneconomic Variables 
Personal inclination toward settling for new contract 
Real Negotiators Student Negotiators 
Union (n = 40) Mgt. (n—32) Union {n — 12) Mgt,. (n = 16) 
Praise and crédit : 
from own team .183 
from other team .034 
Criticism : 
from own team —.080 
from other team —.227 
Perceived success : 
in distributive bargaining .240 
in integrative bargaining .239 
in attitudinal structuring .181 
in intraorganizational bargaining . 120 
Responsibility and authority .088 
Suitable and challenging rôle .312 
Personal growth —.138 
Possibility of advancement .015 
Team policies and procédures .021 
Relationships with teammates .147 
Pattern of relationships 
between teams : 
coopérative action tendencies .179 
legitimacy of opposition .190 
trust & respect .349 
friendliness .152 
Working conditions .144 
Perceived equitability of contract .284 
Work effort .041 
Psychic stress —.029 
.335 .591 
.175 .333 
.202 -.504 
.026 - .329 
.039 .224 
.196 .045 
.404 .046 
.309 .388 
.019 .695 
.124 .574 
.041 - .081 
.035 .243 
.489 .417 
.300 - .072 
.028 .299 
.031 - .198 
.331 - .212 
.325 .263 
.160 - .270 
.548 - .199 
.062 .268 
.093 - .178 
.114 
,188 
.108 
,093 
.434 
.143 
.156 
.451 
.494 
.426 
.516 
.059 
.211 
.418 
.437 
.027 
.407 
.090 
.136 
.318 
.356 
.234 
NOTE : In italic corrélations are significant at the .05 level, one-tailed test. 
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variables were expected to interect with the student-real variable, as in-
dicated in the following hypothèses. 
Hypothèses 
The students who participated in the mock negotiations were mostly 
business majors. Regardless of which side of the negotiations they were 
supposed to be representing, their basic values and attitudes would be 
expected to match those of management représentatives more closely than 
those of union leaders. For this reason, our first hypothesis was that : 
The overall pattern of responses to the noneconomic variables 
for the student management negotiators would be similar to 
the pattern for real management negotiators, but the pattern 
of responses for student labor negotiators would be différent 
from the pattern for real union negotiators. 
The second hypothesis was concerned with negotiating expérience. 
For most of the students this was their first expérience with labor con-
tract negotiations. It could be presumed that their reactions would be 
more like those of real negotiators who were negotiating for the first 
time than like experienced negotiator.1 Thus, the second hypothesis was 
that : 
The overall pattern of responses to the noneconomic variables 
for the inexperienced student negotiators would be similar to 
the pattern for real negotiators who are bargaining for the first 
time, but différent from the pattern for experienced real 
negotiators. 
Hypothesis tests 
Thèse hypothèses were tested by means of multivariate analysis of 
variance, using F-ratio tests. The twenty-two variables shown in Table 1 
were the variâtes used in the multivariate analysis of variance and in the 
discriminant analysis which followed. 
There were eight groups or cells in the analysis. The number of 
cases in each cell is shown below : 2 
i Negotiators who had previously bargained at least one contract were con-
sidered « experienced. » 
2
 The number of cases used in this analysis is somewhat smaller than the 
number used in the correlational analysis, because ail cases with missing data had 
to be discarded. 
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inexperienced experienced total 
union negotiators : real 14 20 34 
student 10 2 12 
management negotiators : real 2 25 27 
student 11 2 13 
The small size of three of the cells was not idéal, but the remarkable 
thing is that we had any experienced student negotiators at ail. 
TABLE 2 
Multivariate F-rariosfor the clasification student-real, labor-management, 
and experienced-inexperienced 
Contract (D. F. = 22/57) 
F-ratio 
chance occurrence 
Probabilïty of 
1. Student-real 2.14 .012 
2. Labor-management 1.86 .032 
3. Experienced-inexperienced 2.92 .001 
4. Interaction of 1 and 2 2.25 .008 
5. interaction of 1 and 3 0.69 .827 
6. Interaction of 2 and 3 1.08 .392 
7. Interaction of 1, 2 and 3 0.79 .724 
The results of the multivariate analysis of variance shown in Table 2 
indicate a clearly significant différence between experienced and inex-
perienced negotiators, independent of other variables. This resuit tends 
to confirm our second hypothesis. 
The student-real and Labor-management contracts are also significant 
at the .05 level, but there is a significant interaction between thèse two 
classification variables. Therefore, it is necessary to examine separately 
the contract between the following four groups : real labor, real manage-
ment, student labor, and student management. 
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TABLE 3 
Multivariate F-ratios for the contrasts between real labor, real management, 
student labor, and student management negotiators 
F-ratio Probability of 
Contrast (D. F. - 22/61) chance occurrence 
1. Real labor and real management 2.11 .02 
2. Real labor and student labor 1.26 .25 
3. Real labor and student management 1.90 .03 
4. Real management and student labor 2.04 .02 
5. Real management and student 
management 3.33 .001 
6. Student labor and student 
management 2.05 .02 
The results shown in Table 3 definitely réfute our first hypothesis. 
Not only is there a significant différence between real management and 
student management negotiators, but also it is the most significant dif-
férence of ail the contracts. Moreover, the only two groups which do not 
differ significantly are real labor and student labor negotiators. Appar-
ently our premise that business students share the basic values and attitudes 
of management is incorrect. Instead, the students identify best with labor. 
Discriminant analysis 
When a significant différence has been found between the mean 
vectors of two groups, discriminant analysis may be employed to discover 
which variables are primarily responsible for the différence. We used 
this technique to identify the variables which significantly differentiated 
between real management and student management negotiators. 
TABLE 4 
Significant discrimînating variables between real management 
and student management negotiators 
Variables F-ratio D.F. 
Trust & respect for opponents 
Possibility of advancement 
Personal growth 
Responsibility and authority 
Work effort 
20.17 1/38 
13.22 1/37 
7.52 1/36 
4.23 1/35 
6.26 1/34 
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The five variables shown in Table 4 emerged as significant discrimi-
nâ tes between the two groups. Examining the means of each of thèse 
five variables for both groups, we found the following : 
1. Real management negotiators expressed considerably more trust 
and respect for their opponents than did student management 
negotiators. This may reflect a différence in maturity of the fact 
that, for the students, the opponents were peers and equally 
inexperienced. 
2. Real management negotiators perceived a substantially greater 
possibility of advancement, but less personal growth resulting 
from the negotiations, than did student management negotiators. 
Thèse différences seem reasonable, since student negotiations 
cannot lead directly to any advancement, but are designed to 
help students grow and learn. Also, most students were inex-
perienced while most management negotiators were experienced, 
and personal growth was by for the most significant discrimi-
nating variable between experienced and inexperienced nego-
tiators. 
3. Real management negotiators felt they had somewhat more res-
ponsibility and authority and that their negotiations required 
more time and effort. This would seem to reflect some unavoid-
able différences between real and mock negotiations. In the 
mock negotiations students were instructed to spread respon-
sibility around so that ail could learn. The greater effort 
perceived by real managers probably reflects the fact that the 
conséquences of that effort were also real. 
Altogether, five of the twenty-two behavioral variables were found 
to discriminate significantly between real and student management nego-
tiators. The remaining 17 variables were substantially the same for real 
and student negotiators. Thèse variables were : praise and crédit from 
one's own team or the other team ; critiscism from one's own team or 
the other team ; perceived success in distributive bargaining, integrative 
bargaining, attitudinal structuring, and intraorganizational bargaining ; 
suitable and challenging rôle ; team policies and procédures ; relation-
ships with teammates ; coopérative action tendencies, legitimacy, and 
friendliness of the opposition ; working conditions ; perceived equitability 
of the contract ; and psychic stress. 
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Summary and Conclusions 
It appears in many respects a complex student mock negotiation 
does a good job of approximating the real expérience. The mean responses 
of student labor negotiators to 22 behavioral variables in their negotia-
tions were found not to be significantly différent from the responses of 
real union negotiators. 
Even where an overall significant différence was found, as between 
student and real management negotiators, the discriminating variables 
seemed to reflect the wouthfulness and inexpérience of the students as 
much as the structure of the game. Indeed, prior expérience in bargaining 
was found to be more significant than the student-real dichotomy in 
différences in responses to the behavioral variables of bargaining. It may 
also be différences in expérience which partly account for the consid-
érable différences between real and student negotiators in the relation-
ships they showed between the behavioral variables and their personal 
inclination toward settling on the new contract. 
However, we must acknowledge some shortcomings in the ability 
of mock negotiation to simulate the real thing. For instance, it is difficult 
to avoid the fact that the student are peers and equally inexperienced. 
It might help if the bargaining could be carried out between teams from 
two différent sections of the course. This would make the sensé of aliéna-
tion between the teams more complète and natural. 
Noncompeting teams from the same section might serve as a cons-
tituency for each other, having a final say on whether the contract is 
acceptable. We were not able in this study to test the effect of the lack 
of a constituent group, but conceptually this is a shortcoming of mock 
negotiations. 
Another problem is the lack of trust between the two sides, which 
is common in first negotiations even in real labor relations. Students might 
be given more instruction concerning the importance of attitudinal struc-
turing and the maintenance of a coopérative pattern of relationships. 
Also, the grading might be made to reflect this aspect of negotiations, as 
well as pure distributive bargaining. Thèse changes would emphasize the 
ongoing nature of the relationship and reduce the purely compétitive 
aspect of the game. Another possibility is to hâve a short bargaining 
exercise early in the course, preceding the more complex simulation. 
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Student seem to hâve more difficulty getting into the management 
rôle than the union rôle. Perhaps students on the management teams 
could profit from some spécial instructions concerning their rôle, They 
should understand some of the regular, ongoing concerns of a manager 
with such items as labor costs and restrictive work rules. 
In spite of the lack of a constituency, or of a sensé that the contract 
is to be a working document, a complex mock negotiation appears to 
simulate the behavioral aspects of collective bargaining quite well. Mock 
negotiations should serve to bridge the gap we found between experienced 
and inexperienced negotiators. This is encouraging news for the many 
schools that hâve been using mock negotiations as a training tool for 
potential future negotiators. 
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Les jeux dans l'apprentissage de la négociation collective 
Les jeux et les simulations sont devenus un moyen populaire d'enseignement 
au cours de la dernière décennie. Leur utilisation est fort bien appropriée à un 
processus comme celui des négociations collectives. Plusieurs sketches de négocia 
tions sont disponibles et en usage dans plusieurs campus universitaires à l'heure 
actuelle. Le présent article décrit l'une de ces saynètes telle qu'on la joue à l'univer-
sité de Washington. 
Malgré leur popularité et leur valeur apparente au premier coup d'oeil, les jeux 
et les simulations n'ont été rarement soumis à une véritable épreuve quant à leur 
caractère réaliste. L'étude des différents aspects de la négociation collective en tant 
que le comportement des parties est en jeu fournit une occasion de vérifier si les 
perceptions des négociations simulées se comparent aux perceptions des véritables 
négociations tant du côté des salariés que du côté des employeurs. 
On a découvert qu'il n'y avait pas de différence significative entre les princi-
pales réparties des aspirants négociateurs et celles des négociateurs syndicaux, surtout 
si ces derniers sont inexpérimentés. Les différences entre les étudiants et les négo-
ciateurs vraiment expérimentés, notamment les négociateurs patronaux, variaient 
surtout selon leur degré d'expérience et de maturité et en ce que les négociations 
« jouées » comportent une responsabilité moindre et n'offrent pas d'occasion d'avan-
cement. Dans l'ensemble, on est arrivé à la conclusion que les négociations simulées 
se rapprochaient pas mal des négociations réelles. En conclusion, l'article suggère 
quelques moyens de les rendre encore plus réalistes. 
LE SYNDICALISME CANADIEN (1968) 
une réévaluation 
Introduction, Gérard Dion — Les objectifs syndicaux traditionnels et la société 
nouvelle (Jean-Réal Cardin — Gérard Picard — Louis Laberge — Jean Bru-
nelle. Les structures syndicales et objectifs syndicaux (Stuart Jamieson — 
Philippe Vaillancourt — Roland Martel). La démocratie syndicale (Gérard 
Dion — Adrien Plourde). Les rivalités syndicales : force ou faiblesse (Evelyne 
Dumas — Gérard Rancourt — Raymond Parent). Le syndicalisme et les tra-
vailleurs non-syndiqués (Léo Roback — Jean-Gérin-Lajoie — F.-X. Légaré). 
L'extension de la formule syndicale à des secteurs non-traditionnels (Shirley B. 
Goldenberg — André Thibaudeau — Raymond-G. Laliberté — Jean-Paul 
Brassard). Le syndicalisme et la participation aux décisions économiques 
(Bernard Solasse — Jacques Archambeault — Fernand Daoust — Charles 
Perreault). Les syndicats et l'action politique (Vincent Lemieux — Marcel 
Pépin — Laurent Châteauneuf et William Dodge). Le syndicalisme, la société 
nouvelle et la pauvreté (Hon. Maurice Lamontagne). Bilan et horizons. 
Annexes : Le syndicalisme au Canada ; la concurrence syndicale dans le 
Québec (Gérard Dion). 
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COMMENTAIRES 
Le rapport Waisberg 
Gérard HÉBERT * 
La Commission Waisberg devait enquêter sur certaines pratiques 
présumément illégales dans les secteurs du plâtre, de la planche murale 
et des formes à béton de l'industrie de la construction, dans les régions 
de Toronto, Hamilton et Ottawa. Formée le 28 mars 1973, la Commis-
sion a remis son rapport en décembre 1974. 
Le rapport présente d'abord une description détaillée des secteurs 
à l'étude, syndicats et entreprises, sans oublier les multiples interrelations 
d'intérêt qui existent entre plusieurs entreprises impliquées. Les chapitres 
suivants (2, 3 et 4) contiennent un exposé circonstancié, souvent par la 
transcription des témoignagegs et la reproduction des pièces, des princi-
paux actes de violence et de fraude, intervenus entre 1968 et 1973 et 
qui avaient provoqué l'enquête : incendies, dommage à la propriété, 
attaques à la dynamite, assauts sur la personne, menaces, paiements illé-
gaux, fixation des prix, etc. Il en ressort certaines descriptions fascinantes 
et quelques portraits hauts en couleur. 
Dès le début du second chapitre, le Juge Waisberg déclare : « Ces 
événements ne se sont pas produits en réponse à de la provocation, ni 
dans le vide. Ils sont reliés, dans le temps et les lieux, à la concurrence 
entre employeurs et entre syndicats, et aux conflits entre employeurs et 
syndicats» (p. 32). Aussi le Juge consacre-t-il son dernier chapitre à 
divers aspects des relations patronales-syndicales : méthodes d'embauché, 
conflits de juridiction, fonds de bien-être, etc. 
De tout cela, le Juge Waisberg tire 4 conclusions et 17 recomman-
dations. D'abord les autorités judiciaires devront prendre les poursuites 
qui s'imposent suite aux révélations de l'enquête. De plus, il faudrait un 
contrôle plus sévère des armes et des explosifs. Sur le plan des relations 
* HÉBERT, Gérard, professeur, École des relations industrielles, Université de Mont-
réal, Montréal. 
Report of the Royal Commission on Certain Sectors of the Building ïndustry. 
Judge Harry Waisberg, Commissioner. Volume One : Report. Volume Two : Ap-
pendices. Published by the Minister of the Attorney General. Toronto, Quenn's 
Printer for Ontario, c. 1974, vol. I : 344 p. ; vol. II : 426 p. 
